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 Chapter 12 
 Semantic Knowledge, Domains of Meaning 
and Conceptual Spaces 
 Peter  Gärdenfors 
 What Is Semantic Knowledge? 
 What is it that you know when you know a language? Certainly, you know many 
words of the language (its lexicon), and you know how to put the words together in 
an appropriate way (the syntax). More important, you know the  meaning of the 
words (the semantics of the language). If you do not master the meaning of the 
words you are using, there is no point in knowing the syntax (unless you are a par-
rot). You can communicate in a foreign language with some success just by know-
ing some words and without using any grammar. In this sense semantic knowledge 
precedes syntactic knowledge. This chapter focuses on an aspect of semantic knowl-
edge that has not been well studied, its organization into domains. 
 Children learn a language without effort and completely voluntarily. They learn 
new words miraculously fast. Teenagers master about 60,000 words of their mother 
tongue by the time they fi nish high school. In their speech and writing they may not 
actively use more than a subset of the words, but they  understand all of them. A 
simple calculation reveals that they have learned an average of 9–10 words  per day 
during childhood. A single example of how a word is used is often suffi cient for 
learning its meaning. No other form of learning is so obvious or so effi cient. 
 Nevertheless, the semantic learning mechanisms show some strong asymme-
tries. For instance, why is it easier to explain to a 4-year-old the meaning of the 
color terms  chartreuse and  mauve than to explain monetary terms like  infl ation or 
 mortgage ? The difference is not a matter of word frequency: The monetary terms 
are more frequent, but the 4-year-old masters the semantic domain of colors and 
thereby knows the meaning of many color words. Adding new color terms is just a 
matter of learning the mapping between the new words and the color space. 
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For example,  chartreuse is a kind of yellowish green, and  mauve is a pale violet. On 
the other hand, the child is normally not acquainted with the domain of economic 
transactions. To the child, money means concrete things—coins and bills—that one 
can exchange for other things. Abstract monetary concepts are not within a child’s 
semantic reach. Grasping a new domain is a cognitively much more diffi cult step 
than adding new terms to an already established one. Once a domain is common to 
a group of potential communicators, various means (e.g., words, gestures, and 
icons) of referring to different regions of the domain can be developed. Conversely, 
if a domain is not shared, communication is hampered. The organization into 
domains speeds up language learning. 
 This chapter presents a model of such domain-oriented language learning, based 
on conceptual spaces. I illustrate the model with some of the semantic domains that 
a child acquires during the fi rst formative years of life. I also present linguistic data 
supporting the hypothesis that semantics knowledge is organized into domains. 
 Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces 
 I have proposed conceptual spaces as appropriate tools for modeling the semantics 
of natural language (Gärdenfors,  2000 ). A conceptual space is defi ned by a number 
of qualitative dimensions. Examples of perception-based qualitative dimensions are 
temperature, weight, brightness, and pitch, as well as the three ordinary spatial 
dimensions of height, width, and depth. The dimensions represent perceived simi-
larity: The closer two points are within a space, the more similar they are judged to 
be. In the next section, I present a number of further dimensions that are involved in 
communicative processes. 
 I argue that properties can be represented as convex regions of conceptual spaces. 
For example, the color red is a convex region of the three-dimensional color space. 
A concept can thus be defi ned as a bundle of properties combined with information 
about how the properties are correlated (for a more precise defi nition see Gärdenfors, 
 2000 , p. 105). The concept of an apple, for instance, has properties corresponding 
to regions of color space, shape space, taste space, nutrition space, and other spaces 
(see Gärdenfors,  2000 , pp. 102–103, for a more detailed account of this example). 
 The distinction between properties and concepts is useful for analyzing the cog-
nitive role of different word classes. In Gärdenfors ( 2000 ), I proposed that proper-
ties are typically expressed by adjectives, which describe a convex region of some 
domain such as color, shape, or size. Correspondingly, concepts representing a com-
plex of properties from a number of domains are typically expressed by nouns. 
Gärdenfors and Warglien ( 2012 ) extended this analysis to verbs on the basis of the 
models of actions and events outlined in the section on Action domain, below. 
 Because the notion of a domain is central to my analysis, I should clarify its 
meaning. To do so, I draw on cognitive psychology’s notions of separable and inte-
gral dimensions (see Garner,  1974 ; Maddox,  1992 ; and Melara,  1992 , among oth-
ers). A set of quality dimensions are said to be integral if one cannot assign an object 
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a value in one dimension without giving it a value in one or more others. For exam-
ple, an object cannot be given a hue without also giving it a brightness, and the pitch 
of a sound always goes along with its loudness. Dimensions that are not integral are 
said to be separable, as is the case with the size and hue dimensions. This distinction 
allows a domain to be defi ned as a set of integral dimensions separable from all 
other dimensions. 
 The notion of a domain has been used to some extent in cognitive linguistics 
(e.g., Croft,  2002 ; Croft & Cruse,  2004 ; Langacker,  1986 ). Langacker ( 1986 ) pre-
sented his notion of a basic domain as follows:
 It is however necessary to posit a number of “basic domains,” that is, cognitively irreducible 
representational spaces or fi elds of conceptual potential. Among these basic domains are 
the experience of time and our capacity for dealing with two- and three-dimensional spatial 
confi gurations. There are basic domains associated with various senses: color space (an 
array of possible color sensations), coordinated with the extension of the visual fi eld; the 
pitch scale; a range of possible temperature sensations (coordinated with positions on the 
body); and so on. Emotive domains must also be assumed. It is possible that certain linguis-
tic predications are characterized solely in relation to one or more basic domains, for exam-
ple, time for [BEFORE], color space for [RED], or time and the pitch scale for [BEEP]. 
However most expressions pertain to higher levels of conceptual organization and presup-
pose non-basic domains for their semantic characterization. (p. 5) 
 Langacker’s notion of domain fi ts well with the one I present. Besides basic domains, 
Langacker also talked about abstract domains, for which identifying the underlying 
dimensions is more diffi cult. In general, though, it seems that the notion of a domain 
within cognitive linguistics has a broader meaning than I intend (see Gärdenfors & 
Löhndorf,  2013 , for a narrower use). Croft and Cruse ( 2004 , chap. 2), for example, 
even identifi ed domains with frames. 
 Semantic Domains Involved in Children’s Development 
 Levels of Intersubjectivity 
 Using conceptual spaces as my framework, I now trace the development of semantic 
knowledge in children by identifying and describing the domains that are required 
for various basic forms of communication. A central hypothesis is that many of 
these domains are tightly connected to the development of intersubjectivity (also 
called  theory of mind ). In this context, I use the term  intersubjectivity to mean the 
sharing and representing of others’ mentality. Following Gärdenfors ( 2008 ), I break 
intersubjectivity down into fi ve capacities: representing the emotions of others 
(empathy), representing the attention of others, representing the desires of others, 
representing the intentions of others, and representing the beliefs and knowledge of 
others, an ordering arguably supported by phylogenetic and ontogenetic evidence 
(see Gärdenfors,  2003 ,  2008 ). These fi ve components are exploited so naturally in 
adult human communication that their importance often escapes attention. 
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 Emotive Domain 
 The ability to share others’ emotions is often called  empathy (Preston & de Waal, 
 2002 ). Bodily and vocal expressions of emotion, the most obvious signals among 
the social animals, communicate the agent’s negative or positive experiences. 
Preston and de Waal argue that most, if not all, mammals are endowed with empa-
thy (at least in a basic form) as a mechanism linking perception and action. 
 The importance of empathy to interaction highlights the question of how emo-
tions are represented mentally. Several competing theories on the structure of the 
emotive domain exist. However, most of these theories contain two basic dimen-
sions: a value dimension on a scale from positive to negative aspects of emotions, 
and an arousal dimension on a scale from calm to excited emotional states (e.g., 
Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum,  1957 ; Russell,  1980 ). 1 The Cartesian product of 
these two dimensions allows a spatial representation of the basic emotions (see Fig. 
 12.1 ). Distances in emotive space indicate degrees of similarity between emotions.
 It is well known that emotive intersubjectivity is an important aspect of mother–
infant attunement interactions (Stern,  1985 ). The infant learns the correlation 
between different emotions and the corresponding facial and vocal expressions. In 
other words, the child learns how to map behaviors into an emotive space. Sharing 
an emotion means that the participants in the exchange are in emotional states that 
are closely located within the same emotive space. That is, the emotions are attuned. 
Such coordination of emotions is arguably the most fundamental way of sharing 
meaning. 
 Visual and Physical Domains 
 During the fi rst months of life, the child learns to coordinate sensory input—
vision, hearing, touch and smell—with motor activities (Thelen & Smith,  1994 ). 
This process generates a narrow, egocentric space that basically maps onto her 
or his visual fi eld. The subsequent role of this space in intersubjective engage-
ment is manifested, for example, by the child’s ability, as of 6 months of age, to 
follow the gaze of the mother if she turns her head to look at an object within 
the visual fi eld of the child (D’Entremont,  2000 ). From 12 months of age, the 
child can follow the mother’s gaze if the mother just turns her eyes toward the 
object (Butterworth & Jarret,  1991 ). 
 Representing the attention of others means that one can understand when some-
one is looking at some object or noticing some event. As suggested above, even very 
young children can understand where other people are looking. Shared attention is 
the result of two agents simultaneously attending to the same target. It has clearly 
1  Of course, a representation of more nuanced emotions may involve further dimensions. 
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been demonstrated among the great apes (Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello,  2000 ). 
A more sophisticated version is drawing  joint attention to an object. If I see that you 
are looking at an object, and you see that I see the same object, we have established 
joint attention. 
 The visual domain expands throughout the child’s development. From about 18 
months on, a child can follow the gaze of others even if they look at points outside 
its immediate visual fi eld. This ability requires that the represented visual space 
extend beyond the current visual fi eld to cover the entire physical space. The child 
can now comprehend references outside its visual fi eld. It should be understood that 
the represented physical space is not just an extension of the visual domain but an 
amodal abstraction from visual, auditory, tactile, and perhaps even olfactory 
perceptions. 
 A more advanced transformation of the represented space emerges with the abil-
ity to represent an allocentric space, a space seen from the point of view of another 
(Piaget,  1954 ). This transformation involves a shift of perspective. A concrete 
example is the ability to direct somebody whose vision is obstructed. 
 More precisely, the domain of physical space should be seen as a combination of 
an allocentric representation of physical space and an egocentric representation pro-
vided by the visual system. This double aspect of physical space is revealed by the 
two linguistic codes established for referring to positions: egocentric  left and  right , 
and allocentric  west and  east (or  north and  south ). 
 Fig. 12.1  A two-
dimensional emotive space 
(Reprinted from Russell 
( 1980 , p. 1168) with 
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 Category Domain 
 Objects are not only located in physical space; they are also represented in a cate-
gory domain that has its own quality dimensions (Gärdenfors,  2000 ). If the physical 
domain represents where an object is, the category domain represents  what it is. 2 
The category domain is composed of a number of subdomains, such as color, size, 
and shape. 
 Although communicative coordination in the emotion and physical domains can 
be achieved without words, coordination in category space is, at the least, enhanced 
by the use of words. The fi rst fi fty or so words acquired by children are mainly cat-
egory words for perceptually identifi able concrete objects: people, food, body parts, 
clothing, animals, vehicles, toys, and household objects (Fenson et al.,  1994 ). They 
are often used in situations involving the joint attention of the child and an adult. 
 Hurford ( 2007 , p. 224) has written that declarative pointing communicates only 
the location of an object and indicates nothing about its properties. This observation 
means that pointing may function without a shared category space having been 
established. Parents often scaffold children with words, in a situation of joint atten-
tion, to provide information about a category domain. As Goldin-Meadow ( 2007 ) 
and others have demonstrated, children combine pointing with words long before 
they rely on words alone. The words complement pointing or gaze-sharing and thus 
expand the possibilities for shared meaning domains in the communicative situa-
tion. The minds of the communicators meet in two ways: in the visual domain and 
in the category domain. Only later does the child learn words for abstract category 
domains such as kinship relations or money. 
 It is not well known how category space develops in children. Some cues can be 
obtained from children’s ability to learn nonsense words for new things (Bloom, 
 2000 ; Smith,  2009 ). There seems to be a shape bias in that the shape of objects 
seems to be the most important property in determining category membership for 
small children (Smith & Samuelson,  2006 ). Children also overgeneralize concepts 
(Bloom,  2000 ; MacWhinney,  1987 ). 
 From 18 through 24 months of age, children undergo what might be called a 
naming spurt, acquiring a substantial number of nouns for representing objects. 
Evidence suggests that, during this period, they also learn to extract the general 
shape of objects and that this abstraction helps in category learning (Smith,  2009 ; 
Son, Smith, & Goldstone,  2008 ). One interpretation is that the development of the 
shape domain, as a region of the category domain, strongly facilitates the learning 
of names for object categories. 




 Value Domain 
 Understanding that others may not have the same desires as oneself requires a rep-
resentation of value space, one that is detached from other domains. This capacity 
develops before the ability to represent the beliefs of others (see Flavell, Flavell, 
Green, & Moses,  1990 ; Wellman & Liu,  2004 ), emerging as a separable domain 
somewhere between 14 and 18 months of age (Repacholi & Gopnik,  1997 ). A rea-
sonable hypothesis given the empirical data is that children initially consider the 
value of an object to be intrinsic to the object, in other words, a dimension of the 
category domain, such as color or size. Only later is the value domain separated 
from the category domain so that different individuals may be understood as assign-
ing different values to the same object. 
 Whereas emotions express how an individual feels, desires express an individu-
al’s attitudes toward objects, events, and other agents. Because desires are rela-
tional, representing the desires of others is cognitively more demanding than 
representing their emotions is. One way to represent an individual’s value domain is 
with a utility function that assigns values appropriately. Other representations exist. 
However, I do not discuss the structure of the value domain in this chapter. 
 Action Domain 
 Experiments on how one perceives the movement of persons and other objects (e.g., 
Giese & Lappe,  2002 ; Giese & Poggio,  2003 ; Johansson,  1973 ) have suggested that 
the kinematics of movement contain suffi cient information to identify the underly-
ing dynamic force patterns. Runeson ( 1994 , pp. 386–387) has gone further, claim-
ing that one can directly perceive the forces that control different kinds of motion. 
The process is automatic; one cannot help but see the forces. This capacity seems to 
develop early in infancy (White,  1995 ). Thus, the force domain can be understood 
as a shared domain for purposes of communication. 
 In Gärdenfors ( 2007b ) and Gärdenfors and Warglien ( 2012 ), that analysis was 
extended to actions and the forces involved in generating those actions. The basic 
premise is that an action can be represented as a pattern of force vectors. The force 
pattern for running is different from the force pattern for walking; the force pattern 
for saluting is different from that of throwing (Vaina & Bennour,  1985 ). Note that 
forces as represented by the brain are psychological constructs and not Newton’s 
scientifi c concept. 
 Similarities between actions should be studied in order to identify the structure 
of the action space. This investigation can be done with the same basic methods as 
those used for objects. Walking is more similar to running than it is to throwing. 
Little is known about the geometrical structure of action space. I make the rather 
weak assumption that the concept of betweenness remains meaningful. An action 
concept can then be characterized, like other concepts, as a convex region, in this 
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case of force patterns. Unlike other ways of modeling action, this form of represen-
tation does not require explicit representation of the time domain. Explicit represen-
tations of time appear to develop comparatively late in childhood. 
 Like other basic domains, forces can be understood metaphorically. Language 
often describes applications of mental force, as when one person threatens or per-
suades another. In such cases the term  power is often substituted for that of  force 
(Gärdenfors,  2007a ; Winter & Gärdenfors,  1995 ). 
 Goal Domain 
 Even though one can interpret another’s behavior as goal-directed, doing so need 
not mean that one represents the other’s intention. It is suffi cient to represent the 
action’s goal. Because the human cognitive system takes self-induced motion as a 
cue for goal-directedness, intentions to act are inferred from observed behavior. 
Gergely and Csibra ( 2003 ) argued that infants do not primarily interpret instrumen-
tal actions as intentional actions. Instead, they judge them by their effi ciency in 
reaching a goal, perceiving them as a function of the physical constraints of the 
agent’s situation, that is, as obstacles, visual conditions, and so forth. Only later do 
children adopt a mentalistic stance, learning to attribute intentions to the actor. 
 Therefore, any representation of intentions requires that goals already be repre-
sented. The goal domain is primary and must be described fi rst. When the agent is 
located at a certain physical distance from a desired object, the goal domain can be 
read from the physical domain. Reaching the goal is reaching the location. The dif-
ference is that, in the physical domain, the locations of the agents and objects are in 
focus, whereas in the goal domain, the focus is on the distances between them. In 
this example the goal domain is the space of force vectors that extend from the ini-
tial to the desired location. When the goal is represented in this way, two principal 
ways of obtaining the goal arise. One is that the agent moves to the goal location and 
grasps the object. The other is that the agent uses imperative pointing, so that another 
individual brings the object to the agent. 
 Goal domains can be more abstract than force vectors in the physical domain. In 
principle, goal vectors can be defi ned in all kinds of semantic domains. If I want the 
wall to be painted purple, my goal is to change its color from the current location in 
the green part of the color domain to the desired location in the purple region. Goal 
spaces are represented as abstract spaces in economics, cognitive science, and arti-
fi cial intelligence. The classic example from artifi cial intelligence is Newell and 
Simon’s ( 1972 ) General Problem Solver. I suggest that these spaces are generated 
by metaphorical extensions from the original physical space and thus always main-
tain the key notion of distance. This hypothesis is supported by the pervasiveness of 
spatial metaphors in relation to goals, as in “he  reached his goal,” “the goal was 
 unattainable ,” “the target was set  too high ” (see also Lakoff & Johnson,  1980 ). 
 Consider next the problem of representing intentions. The basic premise is that 
the intention domain can be seen as a product of the goal domain and the action 
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domain. 3 An intention is thus a combination of a goal and a planned action con-
ceived of as leading toward that goal. Take the difference between  blink and  wink . 
A blink is an often unintentional action, a pattern of forces exerted on the muscles 
around the eye. By contrast, a wink is an  intentional action combining the action of 
blinking in order “to awaken the attention of or convey private intimation to [a] 
person” ( Concise Dictionary ,  1911 ). 4 
 Event Domain 
 The most advanced test for intersubjectivity in humans or other animals is designed 
to fi nd out whether they can represent what others believe or know. The most com-
mon method for evaluating this capacity is the false-belief test (e.g., Gopnik & 
Astington,  1988 ; Mitchell,  1997 ; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer,  1987 ). It is generally 
accepted that this capacity develops in children during their fourth year. 
 Wellman and Liu ( 2004 ) have argued that children can represent other persons’ 
diverse beliefs before they can judge false beliefs. They found that many 3-year- 
olds who cannot pass false-belief tests can still correctly answer a target question 
concerning an agent’s belief that is opposite from their own; it seems they under-
stand that people’s actions are infl uenced by diverse beliefs. Language profi ciency 
in children is correlated with their ability to pass the false-belief test (Astington & 
Jenkins,  1999 ). In particular, parental use of mental predicates in their child-directed 
speech is correlated with their children’s performance in false-belief tests (de 
Villiers & Pyers,  1997 ) . 
 What is involved semantically in representing the beliefs of others, as in knowing 
that somebody has a false belief? Beliefs are normally expressed as propositions. 
So, how is the meaning of propositions related to semantic domains? 5 One possibil-
ity is that most simple propositions express events. In Gärdenfors and Warglien 
( 2012 ), we modeled an event in terms of two vectors: a force  vector , which typically 
represents an action performed by an agent, and a result vector, which describes a 
change in the location or properties of a patient. 6 Consequently, the event domain is 
cognitively more complex than other domains. 
 Given this model, one may reasonably speculate that understanding the beliefs of 
others requires understanding their representation of events. If this conjecture is 
3  Product is meant in the mathematical sense. The intention domain is that product space generated 
from the goal domain (a vector space) and the action space (derived from the space of forces). 
4  As I show in the following section, this model of intentions is the same as the model of events—
except that the action involved in an intention is only planned. This analysis fi ts well with Gergely 
and Csibra’s ( 2003 ) proposal that one infers the intentions of a person from the beliefs and desires 
one attributes to that person. 
5  Cognitive semantics has traditionally not handled propositions well. 
6  The event domain can thus be expressed as the product space of the action domain and either the 
physical or the category domain (see intentions). 
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correct, it is no wonder that understanding the beliefs of others develops rather late 
in childhood. Consider Nelson ( 1996 ), who showed how the use of the word  know 
develops over time in children and does not achieve its ordinary meaning until after 
children can pass the false-belief test. 
 This section has identifi ed a number of semantic domains needed for children’s 
communication. Several are based on the different possible levels of intersubjectiv-
ity. I have outlined how these domains can be represented with the aid of conceptual 
spaces. Because independent semantic evidence suggests that the domains are nec-
essary for modeling basic meanings, their connection to intersubjectivity can be 
used as a stepping stone to an analysis of the development of semantic knowledge. 
 Some Linguistic Evidence of Semantic Domain Knowledge 
 A central thesis of this chapter is that the semantic domains, as structured by con-
ceptual spaces, form an important part of semantic knowledge. In this section I 
present linguistic evidence that the development of semantic knowledge can appro-
priately be described as the development of separable semantic domains. 
 In the analysis of child language data, the establishment of a word in the vocabu-
lary of children is often analyzed for the average frequency of the word’s usage at a 
certain age. 7 Typically, the frequency of a word’s usage starts at or close to zero, 
increases rapidly, then levels off once the word is established in the vocabulary. 8 The 
resulting curve thus has an  S shape. I hereafter call the interval during which usage 
increases rapidly the  establishment period for a word. 
 I can now formulate a general hypothesis concerning semantic domains:  If one 
word from a domain is learned during a certain establishment period, then other 
(common) words from the same domain tend to be learned during roughly the same 
period. In order to test this hypothesis, I have analyzed data from the Child Language 
Data Exchange System (CHILDES) corpus and have used the publicly available 
web-based ChildFreq application, a highly effi cient tool for such investigations. 9 
In this chapter I can present only a few examples from my analysis. 
 For most of the domains discussed in the previous section, words are established 
during the language spurt that takes place between 12 and 24 months of age. This 
observation holds in particular for the different regions of the category domain. For 
example, consider the region of fruits, part of the category domain. Figure  12.2 
shows the frequency curves for the names of several of the most common fruits: 
 apple ,  banana ,  pear ,  grape , and  orange . These words have an establishment period 
7  An alternative to using age as the independent variable is to consider the general linguistic com-
petence of the children, often measured in terms of an utterance’s mean length (number of words). 
8  In fact, a word’s usage usually shows a slow decline, in part because the need for any particular 
word decreases as more words are learned. 
9  ChildFreq was developed by Rasmus Bååth. It is available at  http://childfreq.sumsar.net/ 
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between 12 and 18 months of age.  Orange is something of an exception, probably 
because it is also used within the color domain.
 There are some domains for which the words are clearly established later. One 
such domain is that relating to life and death. Figure  12.3 shows that the establish-
ment of the words  live ,  die ,  alive , and  dead occurs mostly between 30 and 42 months 
of age.
 Another example is the domain relating to knowledge and memory. Figure  12.4 
shows the frequency curves for the words  believe ,  remember ,  forget , and  guess . In 
this case the establishment period occurs between 36 and 54 months of age. Note 
that these words concern an individual’s relation to facts and thereby relate to the 
event domain (see the immediately preceding section). Furthermore, the period 
coincides with the one during which children learn to pass the false-belief tests.
 A fi nal example from ChildFreq concerns the levels of intersubjectivity (see the 
section on Levels of Intersubjectivity, above). It is diffi cult to fi nd a clear correspon-
dence between these levels and the learning of particular words. However, I have 
chosen the verb  look as an indicator of understanding the attention of others; and the 
verbs  want to and  wanna as indicators of understanding desires;  going to and  gonna 
as indicators of understanding intentions; and  know ,  think , and  believe (the latter 
 Fig. 12.2  The establishment periods for some common fruit words (Reprinted from Gärdenfors 
( 2014 , p. 67) with permission from MIT Press) 
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two combined into one category) as indicators of understanding belief and knowl-
edge (see Fig.  12.5 ). 10 
 Figure  12.5 suggests that the sequence of the establishment periods conforms to 
the one I proposed in Gärdenfors ( 2008 ). An analysis of the uses of these words in 
different contexts is required in order to establish the connection with intersubjec-
tivity more clearly than I have in this chapter. Note that  know ,  think , and  believe do 
not quite follow the usual  S shape. Their trajectories may partly be explained by the 
many idiomatic uses of these words, which make their frequencies increase at a rate 
more constant than that of other words. Although I can present only a limited num-
ber of examples in these pages, it should be clear that my hypothesis on establish-
ment periods is rich in empirically testable predictions. I invite corpus linguists and 
child development researchers to continue testing it. 
 Further evidence of the domain called organization of semantic knowledge is the 
way that metaphors do not come alone. Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980 ) convincingly 
argued that metaphors are organized around schemas such as “argument is war,” 
“time is a resource,” and “more is up.” I have proposed that a metaphor expresses an 
10  It is diffi cult to identify any expression that corresponds to understanding emotions (empathy), 
for this capacity develops well before words are learned. 
 Fig. 12.3  The establishment periods for some words from the “live” domain (Reprinted from 




“identity in topological or geometrical structure between different domains” 
(Gärdenfors,  2000 , p. 176). That is, a word that represents a particular structure in 
one domain can be used as a metaphor to express the same structure in another 
domain. Once a metaphor has established such a mapping, it can be exploited to 
provide other metaphors from the same domain. 
 An example of such a mapping is the designation of certain computer programs 
as  viruses . This metaphor drawing on the biological domain has created a new way 
of looking at this class of programs. It has suddenly opened up possibilities for 
expressions like  invasive viruses,  vaccination programs, and hard-disk 
 disinfection . 
 Conclusion 
 In the tradition of Chomskian linguistics, learning a language is learning its syntax. 
By the same token, one does not know a language unless one knows the meanings 
of the words that one uses. In this chapter I have illustrated some key aspects of how 
cognitive structure constrains the learning of semantic knowledge. The central 
 Fig. 12.4  The establishment periods for some words from the “knowledge” domain (Reprinted 
from Gärdenfors ( 2014 , p. 69) with permission from MIT Press) 
 
12 Semantic Knowledge, Domains of Meaning and Conceptual Spaces
216
thesis is that semantic knowledge is structured by domains defi ned as sets of inte-
gral dimensions. This understanding of domains can be used to analyze semantic 
development in children. I have presented the central domains involved in children’s 
cognitive development, in particular with respect to their development of intersub-
jectivity. I have offered some linguistic evidence supporting the hypothesis that it 
becomes easier to learn new words within a domain once it has been established. 
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 Fig. 12.5  The establishment periods for some verbs related to stages of intersubjectivity (Reprinted 





 Astington, J., & Jenkins, J. A. (1999). A longitudinal study of the relation between language and 
theory-of-mind development.  Developmental Psychology, 35, 1311–1320.  http://dx.doi.
org/10.1037/0012-1649.35.5.1311 
 Bloom, P. (2000).  How children learn the meaning of words . Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 Butterworth, G., & Jarret, N. L. M. (1991). What minds share in common is space: Spatial mecha-
nisms serving joint visual attention in infancy.  British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 
55–72. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00862.x 
 Concise Dictionary of Current English, The. (1911). Adapted by H. W. Fowler & F. G. Fowler. 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 
 Croft, W. (2002). The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. In R. 
Dirven & R. Pörings (Eds.),  Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast (pp. 161–
205). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
 Croft, W., & Cruse, D. A. (2004).  Cognitive linguistics . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 D’Entremont, B. (2000). A perceptual-attentional explanation of gaze following in 3- and to 
6-months-olds.  Developmental Science, 3, 302–311. doi: 10.1111/1467-7687.00124 
 de Villiers, J., & Pyers, J. (1997). Complementing cognition: The relationship between language 
and theory of mind. In E. Hughes, M. Hughes, & A. Greenhill (Eds.),  Proceedings of the 21st 
Annual Boston University Conference on Language Development (pp. 136–147). Somerville: 
Cascadilla Press. 
 Fenson, L., Dale, P. S., Reznick, J. S., Bates, E., Thal, D. J., Pethick, S. J., Tomasello, M., Mervis, 
C. B., & Stiles, J. (1994). Variability in early communicative development.  Monographs of the 
Society for Research in Child Development, 59 (5) . Retrieved from  http://www.jstor.org/
stable/1166092 
 Flavell, J. H., Flavell, E. R., Green, F. L., & Moses, L. J. (1990). Young children’s understanding 
of fact beliefs versus value beliefs.  Child Development, 61, 915–928. Retrieved from  http://
www.jstor.org/stable/1130865 
 Gärdenfors, P. (2000).  Conceptual spaces: The geometry of thought . Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 Gärdenfors, P. (2003).  How homo became sapiens: On the evolution of thinking . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Gärdenfors, P. (2007a). Cognitive semantics and image schemas with embodied forces. In J. M. 
Krois, M. Rosengren, A. Steidele, & D. Westerkamp (Eds.),  Embodiment in cognition and 
culture (pp. 57–76). Amsterdam: Benjamins. 
 Gärdenfors, P. (2007b). Representing actions and functional properties in conceptual spaces. In T. 
Ziemke, J. Zlatev, & R. M. Frank (Eds.),  Body, language and mind: Vol. 1. Embodiment (pp. 
167–195). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
 Gärdenfors, P. (2008). Evolutionary and developmental aspect of intersubjectivity. In H. 
Liljenström & P. Århem (Eds.),  Consciousness transitions: Phylogenetic, ontogenetic and 
physiological aspects (pp. 281–385). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 Gärdenfors, P. (2014). Geometry of meaning: Conceptual spaces as a basis for semantics, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 Gärdenfors, P., & Löhndorf, S. (2013). What is a domain? Dimensional structures versus mero-
nymic relations.  Cognitive Linguistics, 24, 437–456. doi: 10.1515/cog-2013-0017 
 Gärdenfors, P., & Warglien, M. (2012). Using conceptual space to model actions and events. 
 Journal of Semantics, 29, 445 – 486. doi: 10.1093/jos/ffs007 
 Garner, W. R. (1974).  The processing of information and structure . Potomac: Erlbaum. 
 Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naive theory of rational 
action.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 287–292. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00128-1 
 Giese, M. A., & Lappe, M. (2002). Measurement of generalization fi elds for the recognition of 
biological motion.  Vision Research, 42, 1847–1858. doi: 10.1016/S0042-6989(02)00093-7 
 Giese, M. A., & Poggio, T. (2003). Neural mechanisms for the recognition of biological move-
ments.  Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 179 – 192. doi: 10.1038/nrn1057 
12 Semantic Knowledge, Domains of Meaning and Conceptual Spaces
218
 Goldin-Meadow, S. (2007). Pointing sets the stage for learning language and creating language. 
 Child Development, 78, 741–745. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01029.x 
 Gopnik, A., & Astington, J. W. (1988). Children’s understanding of representational change and 
its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance–reality distinction.  Child 
Development, 59, 26–37. Retrieved from  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1130386 
 Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Chimpanzees know what conspecifi cs do 
and do not see.  Animal Behaviour, 59, 771–785. doi: 10.1006/anbe.1999.1377 
 Hurford, J. R. (2007).  The origins of meaning: Language in the light of evolution . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Johansson, G. (1973). Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis. 
 Perception and Psychophysics, 14, 201–211. doi: 10.3758/BF03212378 
 Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980).  Metaphors we live by . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 Langacker, R. W. (1986). An introduction to cognitive grammar,  Cognitive Science ,  10, 1–40. 
doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog1001_1 
 MacWhinney, B. (1987).  Mechanisms of language acquisition . Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 Maddox, W. T. (1992). Perceptual and decisional separability. In G. F. Ashby (Ed.),  Multidimensional 
models of perception and cognition (pp. 147–180). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 Melara, R. D. (1992). The concept of perceptual similarity: From psychophysics to cognitive psy-
chology. In D. Algom (Ed.),  Psychophysical approaches to cognition (pp. 303–388). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 Mitchell, P. (1997).  Introduction to theory of mind: Children, autism and apes . London: Arnold. 
 Nelson, K. (1996).  Language in cognitive development: The emergence of the mediated mind . 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Newell, A., & Simon, H. (1972).  Human problem solving . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
 Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957).  The measurement of meaning . Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press. 
 Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., & Wimmer, H. (1987). Three-year-olds’ diffi culty with false belief: The 
case for a conceptual defi cit.  British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5, 125–137. 
doi: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.1987.tb01048.x 
 Piaget, J. (1954).  The construction of reality in the child (M. Cook, Trans.). New York: Basic 
Books. 
 Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximal bases.  Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 25, 1–20. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X02000018 
 Repacholi, B. M., & Gopnik, A. (1997). Early reasoning about desires: Evidence from 14- and 
18-month-olds.  Developmental Psychology, 33, 12–21. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.33.1.12 
 Runeson, S. (1994). Perception of biological motion: The KSD-principle and the implications of a 
distal versus proximal approach. In G. Jansson, S. S. Bergström, W. Epstein, & G. Johansson 
(Eds.),  Perceiving evens and objects (pp. 383–405). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
39, 1161–1178. doi: 10.1037/h0077714 
 Smith, L. B. (2009). From fragments to geometric shape: Changes in visual object recognition 
between 18 and 24 months.  Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18, 290–294. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01654.x 
 Smith, L. B., & Samuelson, L. (2006). An attentional learning account of the shape bias. 
 Developmental Psychology, 42, 1339–1343. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.42.6.1339 
 Son, J. Y., Smith, L. B., & Goldstone, R. L. (2008). Simplicity and generalization: Short-cutting 
abstraction in children’s object categorizations.  Cognition, 108, 626–638. doi: 10.1016/j.
cognition.2008.05.002 
 Stern, D. N. (1985).  The interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and devel-
opmental psychology . New York: Basic Books. 
 Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994).  A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition 
and action . Cambridge: MIT Press. 
P. Gärdenfors
219
 Vaina, L., & Bennour, Y. (1985). A computational approach to visual recognition of arm move-
ment.  Perceptual and Motor Skills, 60, 203–228. doi: 10.2466/pms.1985.60.1.203 
 Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks.  Child Development, 75, 523–
541. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00691.x 
 White, P. A. (1995).  The understanding of causation and the production of action: From infancy to 
adulthood . Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 Winter, S., & Gärdenfors, P. (1995). Linguistic modality as expressions of social power [Special 
issue].  Nordic Journal of Linguistics, 18, 137–166. doi: 10.1017/S0332586500000147 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits use, duplica-
tion, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made. 
 The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in 
the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regu-
lation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce 
the material. 
12 Semantic Knowledge, Domains of Meaning and Conceptual Spaces
